The second section turns to the way spec buyers deceived mortgage lenders by committing occupancy fraud, claiming falsely that they were buying as owner occupants so they could benefit from more favorable mortgage rates and terms. Though 
the FBI has pursued some egregious perpetrators of occupancy fraud, the best way of deterring borrowers from committing occupancy fraud is by lenders screening them out through improved underwriting. Telltale signs in loan applications and borrower background checks make occupancy fraud detectable, especially with the aid of specially designed software and a considerable determined effort.

The third section starts by describing the mischief spec buyers caused home builders and condo developers by signaling phantom housing demand and degrading "for sale" housing tracts and condo developments by leaving newly bought homes vacant or filling them with short term rentals. Next, I describe the means used by homebuilders to restrain home flippers. I also explain why these restraints tended to appear only in purchase and sale contracts and not in deeds, confining enforcement to contract actions against flip buyers but not upsetting sales to the flip buyers' buyers. The doctrine barring all but promissory restraints on alienation figures prominently here, along with practical marketing considerations.
The fourth section explores the rationale for a government imposed ban on home flipping. This would be a publicly imposed constraint on alienability. Here, I examine a particular proposal that a law professor advanced a few years ago for a local ordinance that would bar new home or condo resales by spec buyers for a period of years. After detailing the drafting issues that would need to be resolved in such an ordinance, I conclude that an inalienability ordinance would no longer be sustainable, because spec buyers are now welcome and widely perceived as much needed rescuers in resuscitating deflated housing markets by bidding up the prices of foreclosed properties.
dreams of quick riches and started defaulting on their mortgages in droves the moment house prices showed signs of flattening out; they would not be able to recoup their invested equity plus their share of the closing costs. 4 With spec buyers forming about a quarter of the market, University of Texas Economics Professor Stan Leibowitz explains: "[The number of spec buyers is] large enough that if only a minority of speculators defaulted when housing prices stopped increasing, it could have explained all or most of the entire increase in foreclosures started." This means that the driving force behind home price growth is the value of the land rather than the structure itself. Except for the Southwest, where land is relatively abundant, land's share of total home value has increased in all regions.").
3. See Ruth Simon & Michael Corkery, Speculators May Have Accelerated Housing Downturn, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2008, at B8 (reporting that results of a study in which Fitch Ratings found that, in two-thirds of the subprime loan cases studied where borrowers with good credit scores defaulted within the first twelve months, the borrowers had never moved into the properties they said they were going to occupy in their loan applications).
4. Closing costs typically range from 5% to 10% of the house price. Another reason foreclosure rates spiked among spec buyers is that they preferred subprime loans with low introductory, barely affordable "teaser" rates. Subprime borrowing increased dramatically among all types of borrowers in locales with escalating home prices. Even buyers with credit scores good enough to qualify them for prime mortgage loans took out subprime loans.
12 Spec buyers were not too worried about the high long-term cost of servicing this subprime debt once the "teaser" period ended. Optimistically, they expected to sell at a whopping profit long before then and to prepay their acquisition financing from sale proceeds. 13 As house prices cooled and then fell, buyers looking for a quick exit were not able to sell or refinance their subprime mortgages. Mix spec buyers with subprime loans and declining home prices, and you have a stomach churning recipe for a housing finance disaster. As prices subside, spec buyers are more inclined to default than purchasers intent on occupancy, "because the vast majority of people who live in their homes plan to stay there for the long term and will not sell based on periodic economic corrections, thus keeping the market relatively stable." 14 Owner occupants search for the best available place to live and tend not to abandon their homes-and forfeit their sunk costs-at the first sign of prices leveling off. They tend to stay put at least until their current housing outlays exceed what they will need to spend to acquire their next domicile-taking into account all the expenses of selling, buying, or renting and moving to their next place, as well as the hardship of disrupting the lives of everyone in the household and blemishing , http://seekingalpha.com/article/49701-subprime-mortgages-crossing-income-and-credit-strata ("The truth is that many affluent buyers used subprime loans to purchase more home then they could afford with a prime loan, make speculative real estate 'investments' and/or to withdraw more equity from their home than they could with a prime [home equity line of credit].").
13. do not need to stand passively by and lose their homes to foreclosure when house prices are buoyant. In good times, they just need to face reality, list the home with a competent broker, and prepare to relocate. Perhaps if Las Vegas and other cities could have found a way to reduce the ranks of spec buyers in overheated markets, there would have been less overbuilding during the housing boom and fewer foreclosures now. This article recounts the main options potentially available to builders and lenders to detect and keep out spec buyers, including a law professor's proposal for a government imposed alienability limit: a minimum holding period before sale. This is a good time to understand what these options can accomplish, to appreciate their limitations, and to realize why we cannot expect much interest in them during a house price deflation.
II. REAL ESTATE LENDERS SUFFER FROM AND ARE GOOD COST AVOIDERS OF MORTGAGE OCCUPANCY FRAUD
The most favorable home mortgage terms are reserved for owner occupants both to advance home ownership and to recognize the lower delinquency rates of owner occupants. 17 Owner occupants qualify for mortgages with interest rates 40% lower than what banks would charge an investor, much smaller down payments, two months reserve to cover property taxes and insurance (instead of six months), and significantly less documentation since lenders require investors to demonstrate a history of success in managing properties.
18
Mortgage lenders insist that borrowers seeking to qualify for these advantageous terms affirm that they will move into the mortgaged property as their principal residence within sixty days of executing their loan agreements and will continue occupancy for at least one year, barring extenuating circumstances beyond the borrower's control or the lender's written consent. 19 17. See BASEPOINT ANALYTICS LLC, supra note 10, at 2 ("Because lenders typically charge a higher interest rate for non-owner occupied properties, which historically have higher delinquency rates, the lenders often times will receive insufficient return on their capital, and are over-exposed on risk losses relative to what they would have expected for an owner occupied property.").
18. After-the-fact prosecutions do not prevent losses nearly as well as improved underwriting and mortgage lenders denying loans to spec buyers in the first place. On average, lenders will lose about one-third of their investment in a home or condo foreclosure. 29 There are fairly good indicators of occupancy fraud risk, but they require loan originators to scrutinize loan application carefully, increasing the costs of underwriting and delaying loan closings. 30 "The mortgage application is, and always will be, the starting or ending point for fraud. The catastrophic collapse of the subprime market demonstrates a need for all lenders and investors to seriously reevaluate their current approach to risk management."
31
One tell-tale sign of fraud is when the borrower's current monthly housing costs are much lower-200% or more-than the borrower's projected monthly costs for the home being purchased. 32 Another is when a loan applicant who says she is a renter has filed a tax return claiming homeowner deductions for property taxes and mortgage interest payments. 33 A private firm called BasePoint Analytics markets software that is specially designed to ferret out these anomalies. But even the best available software does not eliminate the need for extensive, skillful underwriting, because six out of every seven transactions the BasePoint software identifies as suspicious prove to be legitimate.
34
The increased underwriting effort may be cost justified. "The savings from detecting the fraudulent loan far outweigh the time to review," notes BasePoint Analytics.
35 But many lenders did not act as if they believed this in 2003-2006 when the rush was on to speed loan approvals in a climate of swiftly rising home prices that mortgage loan is unjust. Defendants were fully aware of this condition when they freely and voluntarily entered into the mortgage transaction. Furthermore, plaintiff's fear that the lack of owner occupancy might jeopardize its security is not unreasonable. Since defendants have defaulted, plaintiff has the right to accelerate the due date of the unpaid balance of the debt and to require payment thereof. Such payment having not been made as demanded, summary judgment of foreclosure is appropriate." Greater loan volume meant sizable loan origination fees and interest rate premiums for lenders making risky loans. Lenders competed with each other for investors' funds, and until the riskiness of poorly underwritten portfolios came to light through torrential rates of default and foreclosure losses, investors flocked to lenders offering the highest yields. Even as late as 2008, a lender whose short-term profits fell, as it reduced loan volume by taking more time to underwrite loans and rejecting the riskiest loan applicants, stood to lose investors to its more aggressive competitors. Many investors would have perceived the lender's claim that it was reducing future losses from excessive risk taking as an excuse for its failure to produce competitive yields in the midst of what turned out to be a housing bubble. 38 Unfortunately, lenders usually uncover evidence of mortgage fraud only after the borrower has defaulted and the lender or its agent has carefully examined the original loan file. 39 Lenders reserve the right to call their loans, declaring the balance immediately due and payable, and to foreclose if the borrower did not already prepay the loan. 40 Ordinarily, people who fib do not cost their lenders a dime. They tend to make their payments on time, just like most everybody else. But when those who use deception to obtain financing get in over their heads and cannot-or will not-make their payments, their lenders stand to lose big too. 41 As long as the borrower is making payments on time, a lender who happens to suspect mortgage fraud is put to a hard choice: keep collecting mortgage payments as if nothing is amiss or face a big financial hit by precipitating a foreclosure.
III. TRACT HOME BUILDERS AND CONDO DEVELOPERS HAVE FOUND VARIOUS MEANS OF DETERRING SPEC BUYERS; ALL OF THEM ARE IMPERFECT, THOUGH NOT COMPLETELY INEFFECTUAL
The Damage Spec Buyers Wrought
Spec buyers are good news and bad news for condo developers and tract home builders. A unit sold, even to someone who never plans to live in it, is better for the builder's bottom line than a unit unsold-though only a minority of home builders 36 . See MORTGAGE ASSET RESEARCH INST., EIGHTH PERIODIC MORTGAGE FRAUD CASE REPORT TO MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION 11 (2006), available at http://www.marisolutions.com/resourcesnews/reports.asp (follow "Eighth Case Report to MBA (April 2006)" hyperlink) (identifying "the ever-present drive to speed up the mortgage approval process" and "escalating home prices in many markets" as "[t]wo exacerbating factors [that] have combined over the past few years to pressure the industry into non-traditional practices that will contribute to future fraud reports").
37 Homebuilders are well aware of the risks posed by buyers who are non-owner occupants. According to a 2005 survey of its members by the National Association of Homebuilders, four-fifths of all homebuilders try to confine sales to owner occupants.
52
Home builders report a variety of means to screen out speculators:
1. 64% reported prohibiting buyers from assigning their purchase and sale agreements or designating a nominee to take title at closing;
2. More than half insert provisions in purchase and sale agreements prohibiting sales within the first year of ownership;
3. 36% of builders reserved rights of first refusal to buy back homes sold within the first year at the builder's selling price;
4. 36% refused to allow any units to be rented within the first year after purchase;
5. 18% would not sell more than one home to buyers with the same last names; 6. 18% used a variety of other measures, including steep fees for homes resold within the first year. Condo developers and home builders seldom place the types of restrictions mentioned above into recorded deeds. 54 Instead, these restrictions tend to appear only in purchase and sale contracts, unrecorded. initial sales push for a new development, spec buyers can impact prices enormously, because so many units are on the market at once. After the initial sell out, it is unlikely that individual unit buyers will place their units on the market all at once, thereby reducing the chances that spec buyers could skew prices throughout the project.
Second, developers and builders want to avoid impairing the marketability and value of their units. By placing either a contract or deed in the public land records that limits transfers by non-owner occupants, developers put subsequent purchasers and mortgagees on constructive notice, potentially clouding the titles of all grantees, owner occupants and non-owner occupants alike. 55 Before buying or financing a unit subject to a recorded restriction like this, observant purchasers and cautious lenders would demand title policies assuring them that they are not buying in contravention of the restriction. 56 In order to write such policies, prudent title insurers would seek written, recordable evidence of compliance, probably verified by the grantor or the grantor's successors. 57 This could impede sales not just to spec buyers but also to owner occupants who might have no problem confirming their intentions regarding residency in a purchase and sale agreement but who might balk at accepting a deed restriction that could complicate their attempts to sell sometime in the future and possibly also deter a mortgage lender from financing their present purchase or eventual sale. Imagine, though, a developer or builder determined to stamp out spec buying by any lawful means, regardless of the potentially adverse impact on sales. The most effective way of doing this would be through a recorded deed restriction calling for title to revert to the grantor if a non owner occupant tried to sell within, say, six months or a year of acquiring title. The venerable doctrine barring restraints against alienation might bar enforcement of such a restriction.
Alternately 62 A disabling restraint invalidates the grantee's attempt to transfer property contrary to the terms of the restraint. 63 The transferee takes nothing; title remains intact with the grantee, unburdened by the purported transfer. 64 Under a forfeiture restraint, the grantee's title terminates following a prohibited transfer, and title reverts to the grantor. 65 A forfeiture provision may take the form of a reservation by the conveyor of a power of reentry, exercisable when the grantee tries to sell in disregard of the restriction. 66 The third type, promissory restraints, consists of covenants, conditions or restrictions on the ownership or use of the transferred property, enforceable by a suit for injunction or damages against the breaching owner. 67 A grantee that violates a promissory restraint becomes liable to the grantor for damages or injunctive relief. The burden of disabling and forfeiture restraints falls upon those to whom the grantee attempted to convey in violation of them. Generally, courts are extremely wary of disabling or forfeiture restraints; some courts treat them as invalid per se, 68 while other courts tend to grant enforcement subject to a judicial determination of reasonableness, case-by-case. 69 The venerable doctrine baring restraints against alienation would probably bar enforcement of a restriction calling for title to revert to the grantor if the grantee failed to occupy the unit within a specified time.
70
Generally, no-lease restrictions avoid characterization as unlawful restraints on (involving homeowners' association's enforcement of a no-lease covenant in the deed of a home purchased in a planned unit development). 61. See, e.g., Kroop v. Caravelle Condo., Inc., 323 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975 ) (affirming lower court's determination that an amendment to the Declaration of Condominium prohibiting leasing of any unit more than once during the period of ownership was reasonable and could be applied to an owner who purchased the unit before the amendment was adopted, because the owner had purchased the unit subject to all terms of the Declaration, including the term that the Declaration could be amended in the future).
62 alienation by virtually always being made enforceable only as promissory restraints.
71
The penalties for breach are usually monetary and fall on the condo unit owner who violates the no-lease restriction. Courts generally uphold promissory restraints upon rentals as reasonable restraints on alienation unless the monetary penalties are horrifically disproportionate to the harms done. 72 Rarely are provisions prohibiting rentals cast as disabling restraints invalidating the tenant's lease or as forfeiture restraints, forcing the unit owner to surrender title to the condo association 73 or prohibiting sale to a grantee who admits no interest in ever occupying the unit.
74
Sometimes, courts allow gift-givers to impose forfeiture and disabling restraints against ungrateful donees and their inattentive lenders when the grantor had marked down the purchase price to account for the diminished value of the restricted conveyance. 75 Similarly, courts uphold restrictions imposed by the promoters of subsidized housing to preclude occupants from capturing the benefit of the subsidies by selling or leasing at market prices and, thereby, frustrating the purpose of making subsidized housing available to low-or moderate-income occupants for a long enough 71 . See Kelley v. Broadmoor Coop. Apartments, 676 A.2d 453, 458-461 (D.C. 1996) (upholding a condo association's levy of a surcharge on the monthly association dues of any owner renting her unit, up to a maximum of 25%, where there was no evidence that the surcharge was unreasonable, subjective, or discriminatory).
72. See, e.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 144-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (setting forth the criteria for testing the reasonableness of restrictions). In Laguna Royale, the court held: The criteria for testing the reasonableness of [a restriction on the right of alienation set] by an owners' association are (1) whether the reason for [the restriction] is rationally related to the protection, preservation or proper operation of the property and the purposes of the Association as set forth in its governing instruments and (2) whether the power was exercised in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner. Another consideration might be the nature and severity of the consequences of application of the restriction (e.g., transfer declared void, estate forfeited, action for damages). In Flagler Federal Savings & Loan, the original recorded Declaration of Condominium prohibited owners from leasing their units without approval of the owners' association, but the no-leasing restriction did not apply to institutional mortgagees who acquired title to the units. The plaintiff became a mortgagee of two units while the original Declaration was in effect. In 1984, the owners' association amended the Declaration to prohibit leasing entirely. A few years later, the plaintiff acquired title to one of the units through foreclosure and the other unit by quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure. When the plaintiff attempted to lease the units, the owners' association objected, prompting the plaintiff to file a declaratory judgment action. The court held that the plaintiff was bound by the no-leasing rule included in the amended Declaration, just like non-institutional mortgagee owners who acquired title prior to the amendment.
74. See Bregant, 661 N.W.2d at 502-03 (denying the right of the homeowners' association to enjoin a mortgage foreclosure sale to a buyer with no intention of occupying the unit purchased, because it would unduly impair the marketability of the condominium).
75. See, e.g., Alby v. Banc One Financial, 128 P.3d 81, 84 (Wash. 2006) (upholding a restraint on alienation where it was reasonable and justified by the legitimate interests of the parties). In Alby, an aunt and uncle deeded a family farm that was worth $100,000 to their niece and her husband for $15,000. They conveyed a fee simple determinable, reserving a right of reverter if the grantees sold to a nonfamily member or mortgaged the property while the aunt and uncle were still alive. Five years later, the grantees mortgaged the property for over $100,000 and soon defaulted. The lender foreclosed. The aunt brought suit to quiet title in herself-the uncle having passed away-and prevailed. The foreclosing lender was left with only a personal cause of action against the niece and her husband for repayment of the debt. time to amortize the social investment. 76 By contrast, the doctrine barring forfeiture restraints against alienation would almost certainly preclude developers and builders who sold to spec buyers at market prices from deeding property in fee simple determinable but reserving the right to recapture title to properties sold by non-owner occupants contrary to the agreed "blackout'" period on sales. Instead, developers are entitled to reserve rights of first refusal. 77 They do not have to match the price that the spec buyer may contract to receive from a third party buyer; but developers seeking to exercise rights of first refusal to prevent spec buyers from realizing quick resale profits need to reimburse the spec buyer's purchase price to avoid perpetrating a forfeiture. 78 
IV. SHOULD GOVERNMENTS IMPOSE ALIENABILITY CONSTRAINTS ON SPEC BUYERS?
In one of the most often cited law review articles ever written, Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed pointed out that the government not only grants basic entitlements but also decides how individuals may enforce those entitlements. 79 There are three choices, which Calabresi and Melamed characterized as property, liability and inalienability entitlements. 80 The owners of an entitlement protected as a property right have the prerogative of selling or not and of naming a price of their own choosing. 81 A liability rule empowers others to interfere with or destroy an entitlement (like the right not to be run down by a careless driver) upon payment of compensation through a government-determined procedure. 82 An entitlement becomes inalienable when the state prohibits or limits its transferability between willing buyers and sellers.
83
University of Chicago Law Professor Lee Anne Fennell, in a recent law review article, noted that law and economics scholars have confined most of their writing to property and liability rules and, for the most part, have overlooked the potential positive role that restricting alienability might play. 84 She had in mind situations where market driven transactions are usually thought appropriate but where for special reasons a norm of inalienability could usefully discourage potential resellers from acquiring an asset in the first place. 85 She explores "conditions under which alienability limits offer a more promising point of intervention than limits on acquisition, use, or exclusion."
86
Could alienability rules be superior to limitations on use or sales in discouraging spec buyers from purchasing units in the first place? As Professor Fennell points out, property can be acquired in a quest for wealth accumulation or as an item for personal use and enjoyment. 87 Most home and condo owners acquire property for their personal use and only incidentally as investments. Spec buyers, by contrast, are only interested in profitable resales. Restricting their alienability options should discourage their acquisitions in the first place, relieving lenders and developers from having to spend so much energy trying to screen them out. To date, no government has initiated a measure to render property inalienable in the hands of non-owner occupants pretending to become residents in the way that, for instance, sales of stolen goods 88 or endangered species 89 are prohibited even by bona fide purchasers. Instead, probably the most effective disincentives to spec buying are the provisions in the federal tax code that greatly favor home ownership 90 and deny spec buyers capital gains treatment if they sell too soon. 2006)]. Yet residential rent is a wholly nondeductible "personal" expense, even though part of it is indirectly attributable to the landlord's taxes and mortgage interest. Similarly, the virtue of home ownership is rewarded when the owner sells a home at a gain. Tax on the gain may be escaped entirely if it does not exceed $250,000 or $500,000 for married taxpayers filing a joint return [26 U.S.C. § 121 (2006)]. No other personal asset is so favored. Indeed, the favoritism is so marked that it was in substantial measure responsible for sparking a nationwide movement to cooperative and condominium apartment ownership, which enjoy similar tax blessings.
Id.
91. 26 U.S.C. § 121(a) (2006) (excluding the "gain from the sale or exchange of property if, during the [five] year period ending on the date of the sale or exchange, such property has been owned and used by the taxpayer as the taxpayer's principal residence for periods aggregating [two] years or more" from gross income).
proposal of locally enacting an "anti-speculation zoning ordinance." 92 Enacting such legislation on a local basis makes sense because of the uneven distribution of foreclosures and spec buying "within states and within cities in each state." 93 The proposed ordinance would preclude "first purchasers of residential property in newly constructed developments of a certain size" from selling the property for three years "in medium and large-scale communities of approximately twenty or more units" and "would apply to both attached and detached single-family housing." 94 Professor Pindell's proposal is preliminary and suggestive. Though he does not purport to spell out all the details, he recognizes the need for administrative exceptions for those purchasers truly intending to hold the property for three years, but unable to complete the period because of extenuating circumstances. The inclusions of such exceptions to the ordinance would likely necessitate an administrative system to evaluate the merit of waiver claims, monitor compliance, and conduct enforcement through civil or perhaps criminal penalties. 95 However, Professor Pindell also thoughtfully acknowledges:
[E]xceptions to an anti-speculation measure threaten to swallow the rule as local governments would face understandable pressure to approve individual or categorical exceptions to the application of the ordinance for hardship and similar unforeseen occurrences. The number of people entitled to exceptions could outnumber those not entitled to exceptions, and the administrative burden of identifying bona fide cases for exception could be overwhelming and threaten to outweigh the benefits of the legislation. To comply with due process standards, an ordinance would probably have to be recorded in the chain of title of each affected property in order to invalidate the titles of those who purchased from spec buyers within the three year blackout period. 98 Would real estate closing attorneys, brokers or title insurers be responsible for warning the buyers they represented or insured of the existence and implications of the ordinance? Maybe so. Professor Pindall suggests:
The local government could require that an affidavit of compliance be included with the sales contract or other aspects of the purchase process. A person making a false statement on the affidavit or failing to comply with the instructions of the affidavit would be subject to civil or criminal proceedings. Local government might monitor buyer activity through property tax payments or deed recordings. 99 Since lenders and developers are in a far better position to recognize spec buyers than most city administrators and have a greater incentive to do so, Professor Pindell advances the possibility that developers and builders could be the primary initiators of anti-spec sales provisions. 100 They could enlist local governments to assist with enforcement through development agreements or other means, 101 in the way that private deed restrictions are enforced by local governments in Texas.
102
On balance, alienability limits would not be a sensible response to deter spec buying. For starters, there is the cost to the government of enforcement and of possibly recording notices of the ordinance in the chains of title of all affected properties.
The assumption that a municipally-imposed minimum holding period would deter spec buyers is questionable. After all, this is a class of buyers willing to risk the possibility of FBI investigations and federal prosecutions for mortgage fraud and of having their mortgages foreclosed for violating pledges of owner occupancy. The sanctions for violating a minimum holding period ordinance pale by comparison, especially since it is highly improbable that enforcement would be well-funded and effective.
103
While such an ordinance might not deter spec buyers, it might discourage buyers from acquiring personal residences anywhere in the enacting jurisdiction. The buyers' and mortgagees' title insurance costs would be greater, because proof would be required that they were not buying or financing into a violation. Additionally, purchasers forced to sell within the blackout period due to changing life circumstances-divorce, death, job relocation, financial stress-would need to procure an administrative exception from the local government. They could not safely conclude a sale until the exception was granted. This process could result in a costly delay in a market where house prices were steadily declining, especially if the local government was slow to respond.
Affected owners might find themselves locked into a less-than-optimal situation for a period of years. At least with privately imposed constraints, developers and lenders could grant waivers to spec buyers should a time come when market conditions make spec buyers more welcome.
Consider the adverse consequences Professor Pindell's ordinance would have wrought in his home town of Las Vegas if enacted in 2006. Precluding spec buyers from selling for three years might have deterred some buyers from entering the then overheated market in the first place, but it would probably also have added to the stock 99. Pindell, supra note 91, at 588. 100. Id. at 588-89. 101. Id. at 589. 102. See e.g., TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 212.153 (2009) (allowing municipalities to sue to enjoin or abate violations of restrictions affecting subdivisions within the municipality); 15 HOUSTON CODE § § 10-551 to 10-555 (2009), available at http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=10123&sid=43 (expand "Chapter 10" list; then expand "Article XV Deed Restriction Compliance" list) (authorizing city attorney to bring a suit for injunction in order to enforce restrictions that affect subdivisions within Houston).
103. WILLIAM FULTON, GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA PLANNING 139-40 (2d ed. 1999). ("Even when code violations are caught and cited, local governments have difficulty motivating property owners to comply with the law. The property owners may pay a fine and promise to clean up their act, but in all likelihood they won't change the way they do business-for two reasons. One is that code enforcement officers are usually overworked, and property owners know it will take a long time before the officers get around to doing followup. The second reason is that the threat of further punishment usually doesn't exist.").
of unsold, abandoned and foreclosed houses once the market plunged.
Inalienability rules are a bad idea if they are designed to hold back the shifting sands of market values. Richard Posner reminds us that "speculation is a valid method of aligning prices with underlying values." 104 In 2005 spec buyers were disdained for driving prices out of reach for home seekers. Though spec buyers were not held in high regard when their bidding was perceived as fueling a dangerously expanding housing bubble, speculators are now warmly welcomed for bidding prices off of historic lows. There is a good reason for this. A bursting housing bubble causes pain to many, starting with home owners, builders, developers and lenders. Conversely, spec buyers who snap up houses at severely depressed prices are seen as helping to avert a free fall deflation in house prices and the job layoffs and bank insolvencies that deflation can bring. 105 In the present post-bubble era, speculative buyers are playing a vital function in stabilizing falling prices, especially where they are putting a floor on house prices by actively bidding on foreclosed homes. 106 Some housing markets have become virtually moribund where prices once soared and then collapsed to less than half their former levels. 107 These markets are being resurrected with the help of absentee investors purchasing nearly the same ratio of homes as when house prices were peaking.
108
Perhaps in tacit recognition of the important role of spec buyers in the current market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now will purchase up to ten home mortgages owned by the same borrower, where previously they would have purchased no more than four. 109 Often, the foreclosed borrowers become tenants in the very houses they once owned, pay rents at levels well below their previous mortgage payments, and hope someday to buy back their homes. 110 Though genuine homebuyers may not miss the challenge of trying to outbid home flippers in the housing market, builders and developers welcome any entrants into the ranks of home buyers who can help lift prices above production costs and make homebuilding become profitable once more. 111 A seasoned California real estate broker specializing in branded real estate, resort and luxury condo sales recently remarked, "[O]ne thing is for certain, we sure miss those speculators." 112 Had an ordinance been enacted in Las Vegas like the one Professor Pindell suggested, it would almost certainly have been repealed by now at the insistence of real estate brokers, home builders, mortgage lenders and home owners. An inalienability ordinance would no longer be sustainable because spec buyers are now welcome as much needed rescuers of deflated
